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Abstract 
An environmental levy recently introduced in Ireland imposes a tax at the point of 
retail sale on lightweight plastic bags used by shoppers, previously supplied free of 
charge by retailers. This paper assesses the measure in terms of its environmental 
effectiveness and its ability to raise sufficient revenue net of collateral costs to reduce 
distortionary taxes. Post-implementation surveys of retailers and shoppers are 
presented, covering issues of implementation and attitudes to alternatives. Difficulties 
identified by respondents are analysed. Finally suggestions are made for 
modifications to the levy that would enhance its effectiveness if introduced in other 
jurisdictions.. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines at a levy on plastic bags introduced in Ireland in 2002, and 
assesses its effectiveness as an environmental tax, in terms of the achievement of a 
double dividend for the economy. It analyses difficulties encountered in the 
introduction and implementation of the levy, and suggests refinements to improve its 
effectiveness if introduced in other jurisdictions. 
 
General trends in taxation in Europe, according to the European Environment 
Agency1, show that labour taxes are increasing, capital taxes are falling, and 
environmental tax revenue is relatively stable, while at the same time “green tax 
reforms’ are being introduced in several European countries in an effort to use the 
new stream of revenue to reduce labour taxes.  The agency contends that 
environmental taxes are an effective way of tackling pollution issues, and 
recommends an increase in their use, in part by expanding the tax base to target 
previously untaxed pollutants.   
 
The lightweight plastic shopping bags commonly used in Ireland up to 2002 were 
neither biodegradable nor substantially reusable, and so the environmental threat they 
posed constituted a significant negative diseconomy, not associated with more 
durable, reusable bags. The levy introduced on 4th March 2002 sought to reassign the 
wider social cost of this environmental hazard to those taxpayers responsible for 
placing plastic bags in the waste stream. At the same time, the levy was intended to 
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 The European Environment Agency, “Environmental taxes – Implementation and Environmental 
Effectiveness” (1996) Environmental issue report no. 1 at page 3 
   
raise revenue, which could be used to reduce distortionary taxes on labour and capital. 
In effect, it aimed to achieve a double dividend for Irish society.  
 
The implementation of the plastic bag levy is assessed in three ways: a survey of 
retailers highlights some difficulties with implementation, and assesses the cost to 
business of the introduction of the scheme; a survey of consumer reaction sheds light 
on the drivers of its success, and indicates possible improvements that could be 
implemented; finally, the achievement of the double dividend is measured by 
reference to revenue raised, net of costs of implementation.   
 
The paper is set out as follows. Section two discusses research on the influence of 
taxes on taxpayer behaviour, to provide a framework within which to evaluate the 
levy. Section three reviews the theory on environmental taxes, describes the double 
dividend hypothesis, and briefly reviews studies in this area. Section four sets out the 
background to the introduction of the tax, the alternatives considered by the 
government at the time, and the details of the levy as introduced. Section five 
evaluates the implementation of the tax, reporting results of surveys of retailers and 
customers. Section six addresses the question of whether or not the double dividend 
was achieved. Section seven concludes, suggests refinements on the taxing 
mechanism and avenues for future research.  
 
 2. The Influence of Tax 
A key question in tax research is whether or not taxes can influence behaviour. 
Proponents of tax neutrality would argue not alone that they do not, but also that they 
   
should not. Tax neutrality is often cited as a goal of reform legislation, yet tax systems 
are rarely neutral. Mintz2 states: 
Governments rarely try to achieve [tax] neutrality … they purposely try 
to influence investment behaviour by giving special exemptions or 
deductions  
 
Governments continue to use the tax system, not only as a source of revenue, but also 
as a tool to influence taxpayer behaviour, despite the associated costs. Norregaard and 
Owens3 observe: 
There has recently been a shift from interventionism to neutrality, in 
part reflecting a growing scepticism about the ability of governments to 
‘pick winners’ and an increased awareness that the cost of incentives in 
terms of revenue foregone may exceed the extra investment generated 
by these subsidies. Nevertheless, governments continue to subsidise 
particular activities and sectors.    
 
Scholes and Wolfson4 identified three non-neutral aims in the design of a tax system.  
“Among other things, taxes are designed to (1) finance public projects 
…(2) redistribute wealth … and (3) encourage a variety of economic 
activities that are deemed to be in the public interest.    
 
Environmental taxes place a particular emphasis on the third of these objectives, 
seeking to change taxpayer behaviour so as to minimise activities deemed harmful to 
the environment. The reactions of taxpayers to tax changes, and the degree with 
which they conform to policy objectives, are therefore of particular interest for 
environmental taxation policy.  Maydew5 notes that: 
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 J. Mintz, “The corporation tax: a survey” (1996) Fiscal Studies, 16, 4 at page 41 
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 J. Norregaard and  J. Owens, “Taxing profits in a global economy” (1992) The OECD Observer, at 
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 M. Scholes and M. Wolfson, “Taxes and Business Strategy – a planning approach” (1992) Prentice 
Hall, at 4 
5
 E. Maydew, “Empirical tax research in accounting: a discussion”, (2000) SSRN working paper, 
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Empirical estimates of the extent to which various tax regimes affect 
behaviour is … central to understanding whether and how much those 
tax regimes generate deadweight costs  
 
Many environmental taxes are aimed at an output that is not directly measurable, such 
as carbon emissions, but are levied on a proxy, such as petroleum sales. The plastic 
bag levy is different, in that consumption of the product is measurable, and is close to 
the target of the tax, plastic bags entering the waste stream. This provides an 
interesting quasi-experimental setting in which to evaluate the effectiveness of this 
sort of tax. 
3. Environmental Taxes and the Double Dividend 
This section initially looks at environmental taxes, how they have been categorised, 
and the factors influencing their successful implementation, before going on to 
discuss in more detail the idea of the double dividend hypothesis.  
3.1 Environmental Taxes 
Environmental taxes may be categorised either by target or by purpose. For example, 
Ecotec (2001) 6 identifies nine classes of environmental taxes, targeting respectively 
air emissions, water abstraction, waste water, pesticides, fertilizers, landfill, 
aggregates, packaging and batteries. By contrast, the European Environment Agency7 
categorises environmental taxes into three main types by purpose:   
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 Ecotec, “Study on the Economic and Environmental Implications of the Use of Environmental Taxes 
and Charges in the European Union and its Member States”, April 2001, at page 3 
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 The European Environment Agency, n 1, at 2 
   
*  cost-covering charges - e.g. designed to cover the costs of 
environmental services and abatement measures, such as water 
treatment (user charges) and which may be used for related 
environmental expenditures (earmarked charges):  
*  incentive taxes - designed to change the behaviour of producers 
and/or consumers: and  
*  fiscal environmental taxes- designed primarily to raise revenues. 
 
They note that very often a single tax can serve a mix of these three functions. Most 
green taxes include at least some element of incentive effect in their design, and so by 
definition are not neutral, as they seek not only to raise revenue, but also to directly 
influence taxpayer behaviour, to the benefit of the environment.  
 
The European Environment Agency goes on to include a checklist for successful 
implementation of environmental taxes8. The principal points are: detailed advance 
studies on the likely impact of the tax; extensive consultation with fiscal authorities, 
stakeholders and the public; recycling of the revenues to taxpayers or related sectors; 
an increasing incentive effect over time and in-built evaluation measures.  If these are 
met, the agency contends that the tax should reassign the cost of pollution from 
society as a whole to those responsible for the problem, bringing the private cost of 
negative externalities up to the level of the social cost. This is the essence of the 
“polluter pays” principle.  
3.2 The Double Dividend 
Arthur Pigou (1877-1959) developed the concept of a “national dividend” as a 
monetary measure of aggregate economic welfare9. He noted that an increase in 
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 The European Environment Agency, n 1, at 10 
9
 His work in this area was based in part on that of Alfred Marshall (1842-1924) and Henry Sidgwick 
(1838-1900). See Y. Yoshino,  “An Essay on Pigouvian Externality” (2001) University of Virginia 
Working Paper, for more discussion. 
   
production of a given good can have effects external to the producer, and that these 
externalities can be negative or positive. Common examples are respectively a 
polluting factory, which damages the local environment, creating negative 
externalities in the surrounding community, or a lighthouse, which is useful to all 
ships, including those who have not paid for it, and so enjoy a positive externality at 
no cost. Pigou argues10 that positive externalities persist where there is no efficient 
way of charging the beneficiaries for the spill-over effect they enjoy, while negative 
externalities will persist as long as there is no impediment, since the cost accrues to a 
non-contracting party.  
 
The national dividend is defined as being maximised when negative externalities are 
eliminated. Pigou proposes that this can be achieved by what has become known as a 
Pigouvian tax. This is a levy on products or transactions that produce negative 
externalities, calculated to bring the private cost up to the social cost, and to 
compensate wider society for the negative externality. This encapsulates the “polluter 
pays” principle, that the costs of environmental damage should be paid for by the 
polluter, rather than the taxpaying public.  
 
Within this framework, a levy imposed only on those lightweight plastic bags that 
pose a pollution threat is a fair tax. The argument is that the tax removes a previous 
implicit subsidy by society for the environmental damage they cause, and levels the 
playing pitch for producers of competing, more socially responsible products. Such a 
levy also raises revenue for the government, which should allow it to reduce other 
taxes which create distortions. The most common examples of distortionary taxes 
                                                
10
 In A. Pigou, “The Economics of Welfare: 4th Edition” (1932) London, Macmillan. 
   
given in the literature are payroll taxes, which reduce the incentive to work, and 
capital taxes, which dampen the incentive for enterprise. If a Pigouvian tax can raise 
sufficient revenue to allow the government to reduce labour and capital taxes, the 
argument goes that it will yield a “double dividend”: first by eliminating the negative 
externality, and secondly by allowing distortionary taxes to be reduced. The overall 
effect of the switch from labour or capital taxes to Pigouvian taxes may be revenue-
neutral, but the improved efficiency of eco-taxes constitutes a “second” dividend, in 
addition to the improvement in the environment. 
 
Recently considerable doubt has been cast on the validity of the double dividend 
hypothesis. Arguably, a Pigouvian tax will increase the cost of the product or service 
on which it is levied, and this cost will be passed on to the ultimate consumer, 
negating the effect of any increase in welfare arising from the removal of 
distortionary labour or capital taxes11. This counter-argument has been challenged by 
researchers such as Schleiniger12 using newer models which incorporate the short-run  
public perception of tax savings as disproportionate to price changes.  
 
A second counter argument says that for the second dividend of improved efficiency 
in the tax system to be achieved, the tax raised must be passed costlessly to 
government and back again to those who bear the social cost of the pollutant. This 
recycling must be achieved without contributing to tax distortions in labour or capital 
markets. Effectively, the revenue raised by the Pigouvian tax must be greater than any 
tax interaction effects. This is clearly problematic, but may be less of an issue where 
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Zurich Working Paper No. 93. 
   
the revenue raised from the Pigouvian tax is small relative to that raised by 
distortionary taxes it aims to replace.  Kerr13 notes, “tax interactions are only really 
critical where the anticipated tax is large” 
 
One difficulty with these discussions is that analysts have defined the second dividend 
in many different ways14, which has led to some confusion. There is broad agreement 
on the availability of the first dividend of environmental improvements. Goulder15 
takes the view that the preoccupation with determining the extent of the second 
dividend arises from uncertainty about the magnitude of the first. He defines three 
forms of the double dividend as follows: for weak-form to be achieved, it must be 
shown that recycling the revenues from Pigouvian taxes is more efficient than 
returning them to taxpayers in cash. In the intermediate form, it is theoretically 
possible to identify a tax so distortionary that its substitution by Pigouvian taxes 
would improve the efficiency of the overall tax system. Finally, if the strong form 
holds, substituting most taxes by Pigouvian taxes would improve the efficiency of the 
tax system. Goulder reviews the literature and finds widespread evidence of the weak 
form, and mixed results for the stronger forms. He concludes that more research 
should be focused on the first environmental dividend16. This gap could be addressed 
in part by a study of the Irish levy on plastic shopping bags, since any reduction in the 
pollutant in response to the tax is directly measurable. This makes the tax an 
interesting case-study of the first part of the double dividend.  
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 S. Kerr, “Ecological Tax Reform” (2001) Report Prepared for the New Zealand Ministry of the 
Environment, at 9 
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4. The Irish Situation 
This section sets out the background to the tax in Ireland, and gives details of how the 
levy was implemented.  
4.1 Background to the tax in Ireland 
Despite an international reputation as a rural country with a clean environment, 
Ireland remains largely dependent on landfill for waste disposal. This leads directly to 
problems such as water contamination and visual damage to the landscape.17 
 
The landfill problem is growing. Almost 2.3 million tonnes of household and 
commercial waste were produced in Ireland in 2000 – an increase in excess of 60 per 
cent in five years.  In 2000, 87.8 per cent all household and commercial waste was 
disposed of by landfill, with only 12.2 per cent being recycled. At this time, plastic 
accounted for about 15 per cent (by weight) of landfill waste18. However lightweight 
plastic bags were identified as a particular problem, the plastic commonly used in 
lightweight shopping bags does not degrade in a natural environment even where it is 
disposed of in landfills, and produces toxic gas when incinerated. These bags are also 
prone to wind dispersal. This produces a danger to farm animals and wildlife, as well 
as visual pollution which threatens tourism. All of these factors led to lightweight 
plastic bags being identified as a priority for elimination.  
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 See http://www.epa.ie for an extensive discussion on the problems of landfill in Ireland 
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 Fehily Timoney & Company, “Consultancy Study On Plastic Bags” prepared for the Irish 
government, in association with Aspinwall and company, January 1999. 
   
In 1999, the Irish government commissioned a study19 to examine use of plastic 
shopping bags in Ireland, and their effect on the environment. The report assumed that 
consumptions levels proxied litter levels, so a reduction in levels of use would result 
in a corresponding reduction in plastic bags entering the waste stream.  It examined 
existing trends and initiatives designed to reduce plastic bag use, weighed the 
environmental cost of plastic and paper shopping bags, and evaluated a number of 
alternatives designed to reduce the number of plastic bags ending up in the waste 
stream.  
 
Five categories of alternatives were put forward as possible solutions. These were 
levies at various points in the life cycle of bags, producer responsibility initiatives 
such as return schemes, other regulatory measures such as banning or public 
education, voluntary measures and increased resources for dealing with the problem 
of plastic litter after it occurs.  
 
Table 1 from the Fehily report shows how the effectiveness of each category of 
measure was summarised:   
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Table 1:  Qualitative Assessment of Policy Instruments (Fehily n 18, at 73) 
 Relative Effectiveness (benefits) Costs (economic and environmental) 
 Reducing Bag 
Consumption 
Reducing quantity 









cost of waste 
avoided  




Relative Importance of criteria  Medium medium high medium High high High 
1.  Fiscal Measures:        
Levies on domestic production  N/A N/A N/A N/a N/a  N/a  N/a 
Levies on import N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  N/A  N/A 
Levies on wholesale supply  Medium Low Medium Medium (2) Low  (-) Low (3) Low (4) 
Levies at the point of sale  High Low High Medium (2) High (1)  (-) Low (3) High (4) 
2.  Producer Responsibility:        
Collection & take back schemes Low Low Low/Medium Nil/Low High (5) (+) Medium Medium 
Deposit / refund schemes Low High High Nil/Low High (6) (+) Medium High 
3.  Other regulatory measures:        
Prohibition on some types of bags N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  N/A  N/A 
Public education Low Low Medium Nil Nil (-) Low Low 
Controls on composition Nil/low Nil/low High Medium (7) Low (+) low (8) Low 
4.  Voluntary measures Low/medium Low/medium Nil/Low Nil Medium (-) Low Low 
5.  Street cleaning & bin 
management 
Nil Low/medium (9) Medium (10) Low/Medium 
(11) 
High (+) Medium Low 
1. Assumes a high number of outlets covered by the regulation  
2. Indirect impact of paper bags 
3. Reduction in plastic bag output to some extent offset by increase in output of paper bag manufacturers 
4. Assumes limited exemptions to retail outlets 
5. Requires investment in collection facilities in stores as well as transportation of recovered materials 
6. Same as for collection & take back schemes, except financed by consumer 
7. Could lead to a slight increase in paper bag use with knock on environmental consequences 
8. Most jobs likely to be generated outside Ireland –e.g. US 
9. Depends if recovered material is recycled or not 
10. Intuitive assessment 
11. Additional energy consumed in collection vehicles.
   
At this time, the three major national supermarket chains offered incentives to 
customers to reduce plastic bag usage. Two offered a reasonably priced durable 
branded shopping bag with a lifetime guarantee while the third chain ran a return 
scheme, whereby 0.1p was donated to charity for each lightweight bag reused. The 
former scheme had very limited uptake, while the latter led to a reuse level of only 0.5 
per cent of the chains annual plastic bag consumption. This is in line with experiences 
in the UK of voluntary reuse schemes. The lack of success was attributed by the 
Fehily report20 to consumer apathy and the free and convenient availability of 
lightweight plastic bags. Traditionally, Irish or UK supermarkets have not supplied 
paper shopping bags, and no charge was generally made for the lightweight plastic 
equivalent. 
 
Based in part on this experience, the report concluded that a levy would be the 
optimum solution. This could have been imposed on production, import, wholesale, 
point of retail sale, or disposal of plastic bags. Levies on import were considered 
likely to fall foul of EU regulations21 prohibiting any internal tax on imports in excess 
of that levied on equivalent products produced domestically. This problem could have 
been circumvented by imposing an equivalent levy on Irish-made bags, or by 
collecting the tax at the point of supply to retailers. Such supply side solutions, while 
straightforward to administer, were expected to be less efficient in reducing plastic 
bag consumption, as it was anticipated that many retailers would opt to absorb or 
indirectly pass on the cost, and continue to supply free bags to customers. The point 
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21which call for imports from EU countries to have parity with domestically produced products
   
of sale levy has the advantage of overtly implementing the “polluter pays” principle, 
and this factor was thought to outweigh any complexities in administration.  
 
The first recommendation was for a point of sale levy of at least 3p, just under 4c. It 
was accepted at the time that the availability of alternatives was critical to the success 
of the measure. The use of any alternative to the lightweight freely supplied plastic 
bag would require a shift in consumer behaviour; at very least a degree of pre-
planning which had previously been absent. This was considered difficult to achieve, 
as a previous government report22 had found that a significant majority (69 per cent) 
of all Irish shoppers reported that they never brought their own shopping bag on 
shopping trips. It was anticipated that the success of any policy to reduce plastic bag 
consumption would hinge on the availability of substitutes for lightweight plastic 
bags, their cost and efficiency.  
  
Not all of the alternatives are obviously preferable from an environmental perspective. 
Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) challenges the assumption that paper bags provide an 
environmentally preferable alternative to plastic.  LCA analysis considers all 
emissions generated from activities over the entire life cycle of a product, starting 
from the procurement of raw materials, through manufacture, utilisation and disposal. 
While paper biodegrades easily, it is more expensive to produce, transport and store. 
Many studies23 conclude that a switch from plastic to paper bags would not result in 
any environmental benefit. However, in general LCA does not take into account 
visual pollution or the long life of plastic in landfill. These are difficult factors to 
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 Examples of studies comparing the LCA of paper and plastic bags include The University of 
Winnipeg 1991, Fankling Associates 1990 and Pre Consultants 1996, all of which are referenced in 
Fehily, n 14. 
   
model, absent direct information on how packaging actually enters the waste stream, 
but they are significant in the case of lightweight plastic bags.   
 
From a retailer’s point of view, the free supply of paper bags was found to be twice as 
expensive as plastic bags24. For the user, various factors, including ease of use, 
strength, and reusability are also compromised in the switch to paper. These factors 
were noted by the Fehily report, but largely not addressed by the regulations 
subsequently introduced. The report25 also noted that: 
The objective of the point of sale levy is to reduce the use of plastic 
bags.  The costs of these measures will be shared by consumers who 
still wish to pay the higher price for the plastic bags, and the plastic bag 
supply industry.  To the extent that the reduction in plastic bags is 
compensated by an increase in paper bags, some of this reduction will 
be offset by benefits of increased output in the paper bag industry.  
 
Fullerton et al26 note that many environmental taxes are, for ease of administration, 
levied on an input or output which is highly correlated with pollution, rather than on 
the pollutant itself. For example, US taxes, which aim to reduce vehicle emissions, are 
levied instead on the purchase of gasoline, because it is unfeasible to tax the 
emissions themselves. They note that a true Pigouvian tax is strictly a tax on the 
pollution itself, and that the degree to which such taxes “miss the target” reduces their 
efficiency.  
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 D. Fullerton, I. Hong and G. Metcalf, “A Tax on Output of the Polluting Industry is not a tax on 
Pollution: The Importance of Hitting the Target” (1999) NBER-FEEM Conference, Milan. 
   
As Oates27 observed: 
A tax on the output or profits of a polluting industry is not, in general, a 
good substitute for a tax on the offending activity itself       
 
The inefficiency in the levy on plastic bags is relatively slight. It is levied directly on 
the offending material (lightweight plastic bags), although imposed at the point of sale 
rather than the point of entry into the waste stream. It aims to reduce the inappropriate 
disposal of bags by reducing overall usage.   
4.2 The Levy in detail 
The Waste Management (Environment Levy) (Plastic Bag): Regulations, 2001 were 
signed into law in December, 2001, introducing a levy of  0.15 at the point of retail 
supply of most lightweight plastic shopping bags. At the time, the stated purpose was 
less to generate revenue, than to change consumer behaviour. However, shortly after 
its introduction, revenues were found to be high, and the potential to achieve a double 
dividend became clear. At the time of the introduction, an intense advertising 
campaign was also undertaken, concentrating on the promotion of reusable bags. The 
date for implementation was set for 4th March 2002, to follow by two months the 
introduction of the Euro, allowing retailers sufficient time to prepare.  Money raised 
from the Levy was allocated to an Environment Fund, to be used to support 
appropriate waste management, litter and other environmental issues.  
 
The Levy applies to all plastic bags appropriate for use by customers at the point of 
retail sale, subject to certain exemptions. These are: 
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i.)  Plastic bags used exclusively to contain fresh food products such as 
meat, fish, poultry, fruits, nuts or vegetables, confectionary, dairy 
products, cooked food and ice, provided that they conform to certain size 
guidelines.   
ii.)  Plastic bags used in duty free shops. 
iii.)  Durable plastic bags designed for reuse, which are sold to customers for 
at least 70 cent each. 
 
 Retailers are obliged under law to pass on the full amount of the Levy to the 
customer as a specific charge, and to remit the tax collected by them to the Revenue 
Commissioners every three months. No VAT is charged on the levy, and it must 
therefore be itemised separately on any receipt issued to the customer. Retailers are 
obliged to keep records of the numbers of exempt and taxable plastic bags in stock on 
the 4th of March, and those in each category bought and sold in each accounting 
period.  
 
A national poster and leaflet advertising campaign was undertaken by the government 
in early 2002 to heighten awareness of the aims of the levy. A more detailed 
document was later issued to the retailers, informing them of their obligations. In 
interviews with the author, retailers reported that the advertising was extremely 
effective and achieved what it set out to do. The public was well informed and aware 
of the levy before its introduction, and retailers had relatively little explaining to do. 
They were in general less happy with the information provided to them on how to 
implement the levy.  
 
   
Revenues from the levy are paid into an environmental fund to be managed and 
controlled by the Minister for the Environment and Local Government. The fund may 
only be applied for designated purposes, selected on environmental grounds. This 
practice of designating a stream of tax revenue to specific purposes is known as 
earmarking, and is generally good way of generating support for a new tax. In some 
situations, as pointed out by Markandya28, earmarking can effectively be the price of 
public acceptance of and compliance with a new levy. Earmarking also ties in with 
the strictest interpretation of the “polluter pays” idea, in that the cost of rectifying 
environmental damage is literally met by taxes raised directly from the process of 
pollution. However opponents of the practice29 argue that by siphoning off the income 
from a Pigouvian tax for environmental spending, the opportunity to realise the 
welfare gains from revenue recycling is lost. However, if the environmental projects 
funded by the new levy would otherwise have been financed from the general pool of 
tax revenue, there may still be scope for a reduction in distortionary taxes, which in 
turn would generate a second dividend.  
5. Evaluating the implementation 
In order to assess the implementation of the levy, a survey of retailers and customers 
was conducted in late 2002, 10 months after its introduction. The surveys took the 
form of short structured interviews, and were conducted in person. In order to 
differentiate socio-geographic issues in a countrywide implementation, two 
contrasting locations were selected for study: a small town serving a very rural 
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hinterland in County Leitrim, and in the urban setting of Limerick, Ireland’s third city. 
Retailers were selected with the aim of including as wide a variety as possible, in 
terms of size, specialism and organisational structure. The sample is necessarily 
limited to those who agreed to the short interview. In the rural location of Leitrim, 
90% of retailers approached agreed. In the city of Limerick, the response rate was 
lower at 70%.  Table 2 gives basic descriptive statistics on the data collected. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on Survey Data 
 Limerick Leitrim Total 
Number of retailers 21 21 42 
Number of customers 57 116 173 
Female-male customer ratio 2.8 : 1 1.5 : 1 1.8 : 1 
Average customer age  30 42 38 
 
The older age profile in the rural survey is in line with the general population dynamic 
of the region. The customers surveyed were chosen at random in a wide variety of 
shops in both locations. The questionnaires used a mixture of factual and perceptual 
questions, and in the case of the retailer survey, were followed up with informal 
interviews in many cases. Retailers were asked about the burdens of introducing the 
tax, details of the alternatives provided to customers, the level of plastic bag use 
before and after the introduction of the levy and the ongoing administration of the tax. 
Customers were asked about their attitude to the levy, its effect on their behaviour, 
and their experiences of its implementation. These questions are important, inter alia, 
in assessing the viability of introducing a similar levy in other jurisdictions. In both 
cases, there was an opportunity for the respondent to expand on areas they felt were of 
particular interest, and some of these qualitative comments were very enlightening.   
   
5.1: Retailer Responses 
Over 85 per cent of retailers surveyed reported some administrative or financial 
burdens in its implementation.  Foremost among these were staff costs, covering 
training and wages for longer hours dealing with the increased workload, closely 
followed by the actual cost of providing alternatives. Almost 25 per cent of 
respondents, mainly smaller retailers, also cited a tendency for customers with no 
shopping bag to purchase fewer items, difficulty in monitoring shoplifting, loss of 
shopping baskets and trolleys and for large outlets, difficulty in continuing to provide 
a grocery packing service. 
 
Table 3 summarises retailer responses on implementation of the levy. The results for 
retailers in urban and rural locations are shown separately in columns (2) and (3). 
Columns (4) and (5) show the breakdown between large and small retailers. While 
most of those surveyed in the rural location were small retailers, this apparent re-
presentation is necessary in order to separate the effects of size and location.  
 
Responses are grouped by the nature of questions asked. Group (1) looks at the 
alternatives to plastic bags supplied by the respondents before and after introduction 
of the levy. Group (2) shows the change in the number of shopping bags of various 
sorts purchased by the retailers for supply or resale to customers. Finally, group (3) 
assesses attitudes to the levy on a policy level, and where applicable, attitudes to 
alternative solutions.  
 
The Pearson Chi-square test is used to test for significant differences in mean 
responses between urban and rural, and again between large and small businesses. 
   
The table highlights differences that were significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
probability levels.  












N    21 21 9 33 
Provide alternatives (1) 92.86% 85.7%* 100.0%* 77.8%** 97.0%** 
 - paper bags (1) 57.14% 71.4%* 42.9%* 55.60% 57.60% 
 - cardboard boxes (1) 45.24% 9.5%*** 81.0%*** 22.20% 51.50% 
Provided alternatives 
pre-levy 
(1) 35.71% 23.80% 47.60% 22.2%** 39.4%** 
Free alternatives 
provided 
(1) 61.90% 47.60% 76.20% 33.30% 69.70% 
Mean reduction in 
plastic bags 
(2) 67.00% 
73.77% 60.30% 78.39% 63.94% 
Mean increase in 
durables 
(2) 51.80% 
57.89% 45.37% 49.28% 52.39% 
Should receive part of 
levy 
(3) 45.24% 33.30% 57.10% 77.8%** 36.4%** 
favour a ban (3) 52.38% 38.10%* 66.67%* 22.22%* 60.60%* 
***
 Significantly different at the 10% level 
**
 Significantly different at the 5% level 
*
 Significantly different at the 1% level 
 
Over 90 per cent of retailers currently provide their customers with alternatives to the 
lightweight plastic bags, with most providing a free alternative. In rural areas, this is 
more likely to be a cardboard box than a paper bag. For smaller rural operators with 
ample storage space, whose wholesale purchases are packed in cardboard boxes, this 
is a cheap alternative. It is not an option for city traders with limited space. Nylon 
reusable bags are provided by less than 10 per cent of those surveyed, but their use by 
customers was more widely reported. These are the favoured alternative, with over 70 
per cent of complaints reported from customers concerning paper bags not being 
strong enough. 35 per cent of traders provided some alternatives to customers before 
the introduction of the levy, and this is spread evenly across all categories of 
alternatives provided. Overall reported compliance with the levy was high. Less than 
   
5 per cent of traders said that they continued to supply their customers with free 
plastic bags in breach of the regulations.   
 
The average percentage reduction in plastic bags purchased by retailers was 67 per 
cent, with a slightly higher30 reduction in urban areas. Again, it is worth noting that 
this is an aggregate figure, and includes those categories of plastic bag not subject to 
the levy. There was a 50 per cent increase in the number of durable bags purchased by 
traders for resale to their customers. Only 11 per cent of those surveyed had been 
subject to any independent audit of their compliance with the levy, and in all cases 
this audit was primarily concerned with VAT or with the annual audit of the accounts, 
rather than compliance with or implementation of the levy.  
 
Despite the increased costs, almost half of retailers surveyed rejected the idea of being 
allowed to retain part of the levy, to cover these expenses. Large firms were more 
likely to favour some retention. Retailers interviewed explained that it was easier for 
them to apply the levy when they were seen not to profit from it directly themselves. 
53 per cent of retailers surveyed would have preferred an outright ban on the use of 
plastic bags, which would not have resulted in such an administrative burden for 
them, smaller, rural traders being most in favour of a ban.  
 
Those retailers who gave additional comments on this issue31 overwhelmingly 
favoured an outright ban, citing the administrative burden as the main factor. As a 
second-best alternative, they would have preferred the levy to be imposed at the 
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31
 to a certain extent a self-selecting group 
   
supplier level, although some accepted that this would not have affected consumer 
behaviour to the same extent. Most retailers interviewed reported that some of their 
competitors were not imposing the levy on all customers, which put them under 
additional pressure not to charge the levy to regular valued customers. 
 
5.2: Customer Responses 
173 customers were surveyed in a wide range of shops. Results are shown in table 
four, broken down by location in columns (2) and (3), gender in columns (4) and 5), 
and age group in columns (6), (7) and (8). As before, the chi-square test is used to test 
for significant difference across location and gender, while the Phi and Cramer’s V 
tests are used to test across the three-category age variable.  
 
As above, table 4 shows responses grouped by the nature of the questions asked. 
Group (1) establishes attitude to the levy, and the level of implementation experienced 
by customers. The percentages show the number of respondents who agree that the 
levy is a good idea, and that there is universal implementation by retailers. Group (2) 
gives consumer perceptions of the alternatives provided by their local shops. The 
percentages show those agree that sufficient alternatives to lightweight plastic bags 
are available, who have been charged for these alternatives, and who feel that the 
charge is fair. Group (3) gives factual information on the level of re-use or recycling 
by individual shoppers before the levy was implemented, and the alternatives they 
now use. The percentages indicate those who had recycled or reused plastic bags prior 
to the implementation of the levy, and those who now use paper bags or cardboard 
boxes. Group (4) shows shoppers’ attitudes to alternative solutions such as a ban or a 
higher levy, showing the percentage that would favour such measures. Group (5) 
   
reports the percentage of shoppers in each age, gender or location group who view the 
levy as a deterrent, or sometimes still use plastic bags.  
Table 4: Customer responses 
    Location Gender Age 
















 N 173 173 57 116 61 112 65 73 35 
(1) "Good idea" 171 80.7% 76.8% 82.6% 86.9% 77.3% 75.0%* 88.9%* 74.3%* 
(1) Universal 
Implementation 
172 77.3% 69.6%* 81.0%* 86.7%** 72.3%** 71.9% 78.1% 85.7% 
(2) Sufficient 
alternatives 
172 68.0% 58.9%* 72.4%* 70.5% 66.7% 69.2% 62.5% 77.1% 
(2) Charged for 
alternatives 
162 46.9% 56.0% 42.9% 46.4% 47.2% 42.1% 50.0% 48.5% 
(2) Charge is fair 113 86.7% 81.6% 89.3% 91.7% 84.4% 87.8% 85.2% 88.9% 
(3) Recycled/reused 
before levy? 
173 69.9% 64.9% 72.4% 60.7%** 75%** 40.0%* 24.7%* 22.9%* 
(3)  Use paper bags 173 38.2% 64.9%*** 25%*** 39.3% 37.5% 49.2%* 30.1%* 34.3%* 
(3)  Use boxes 173 42.2% 14%*** 56%*** 50.8%* 37.5%* 23.1%*** 49.3%*** 62.9%*** 
(4) Prefer a higher 
levy 
167 26.9% 31.5% 24.8% 34.5%* 22.9%* 25.8% 29.6% 23.5% 
(4) Prefer a ban 169 47.3% 53.7% 44.3% 42.6% 50.0% 46.0% 54.8% 33.3% 
(5) Levy a deterrent 171 69.0% 85.7%*** 60.9%*** 70.0% 68.5% 75.0% 66.7% 62.9% 
(5) Sometimes pay 
levy 
173 64.2% 71.9% 60.3% 60.7% 66.1% 61.5% 69.9% 57.1% 
 ***
 Significantly different at the 10% level 
**
 Significantly different at the 5% level 
*
 Significantly different at the 1% level 
 
Most customers report a high level of satisfaction with the levy, particularly in the 
middle age group. Income levels and environmental awareness may drive this. Those 
in rural areas are more likely to feel the levy was a good idea, report higher levels of 
compliance by traders, and happier with the alternatives offered by traders. 
Interestingly, they are far more likely to use cardboard boxes than paper bags, though 
this latter finding may be in part driven by age. Respondents to the rural survey, 
tended to be older, in line with the overall population profiles of Leitrim and 
Limerick.  
 
While 95% of retailers report implementing the levy in full, customers surveyed 
reported that over 30 per cent of retail outlets were not applying the levy. It is 
   
noteworthy, however, that they tended to include in this number the supply of bags by 
exempt traders, such as duty-free shops or butchers. The true level of non-compliance 
is therefore likely to lie between 5% and 30%.  
 
An overwhelming majority of respondents said charges made for substitutes for 
lightweight plastic bags were fair, and report being happy with the alternatives 
available. Rural shoppers were more likely to report sufficient alternatives.  
 
Apart from a slight gender difference, respondents are consistent in opposing a higher 
levy, and providing limited support for a total ban. Urban shoppers are more likely to 
report finding the levy to be a deterrent. Almost two thirds of those surveyed still 
occasionally use lightweight plastic bags. This was most commonly reported in small 
grocery outlets, where unplanned purchases are likely.  
 
Those who reported reuse and recycling prior to the ban are significantly32 more 
likely to use paper bags as an alternative now.  This may be in part an age effect, as 
respondents in the youngest age group are more likely to have reused plastic bags 
before the introduction of the levy, and are now more likely to choose paper bags 
rather than cardboard boxes.  Urban shoppers also favour paper bags over cardboard 
boxes.  
 
Those who report that following the implementation of the levy they never use 
lightweight plastic bags are significantly33 more likely to use durable bags or paper 
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bags as an alternative now. Interestingly, they are significantly34 less likely to report 
finding the 15c levy to be a deterrent, suggesting that they are responding to an 
increased awareness of environmental concerns rather than a desire to pay less tax.  
 
All in all, customer satisfaction with the levy is high, particularly in rural areas where 
free durable alternatives are more likely to be available. The level of the tax does not 
appear to be an issue with shoppers. While a substantial minority would favour an 
outright ban on lightweight plastic shopping bags, over 80 per cent regard the levy as 
“a good idea”, and report high levels of compliance by retailers.  
 
The next section considers whether or not a double dividend was achieved, given the 
findings of the surveys above. 
 
6. Was there a double dividend? 
This section separately evaluates the achievement of the first, environmental dividend, 
and the secondary benefit in terms of reducing the cost to society as a whole of 
distortionary taxes.  
6.1 Achieving the first dividend 
For the first dividend to be achieved there must be a reduction in the numbers of 
lightweight plastic bags entering the waste stream, and no increase in use of 
environmentally damaging alternatives. The Fehily report35 assumed that any 
reduction in use would result in a reduction in bags entering the waste stream. If this 
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is accepted, then the levy certainly achieved a significant reduction in lightweight 
plastic bag waste. The levy generated income of  9.6 million in the ten month period 
following implementation. This represents a levy charged on 65 million plastic bags, 
or an annualise figure of 75 million. Since previous annual consumption of plastic 
bags was estimated at 1.26 billion36, this represents a reduction in consumption of 
94%. Perhaps equally importantly, the surveys show an attitude shift on behalf of 
users, with most consumers and retailers reported a dramatic reduction in use.  
 
The impact on the environment of the alternatives used also needs to be considered. 
Where cardboard boxes are passed on to customers, this re-use of a product that 
would otherwise immediately enter the waste stream has no adverse environmental 
impact. By contrast, Life Cycle Assessment of paper bags shows them to be only 
marginally more eco-friendly than the lightweight bags they replace. Durable bags 
have a low environmental impact, provided they are reused often, but there is no 
satisfactory way of measuring the degree of reuse. Nevertheless, a switch has been 
made from lightweight plastic bags to a range of alternatives, most of which have 
lower impact on the environment, and none of which have greater. It follows therefore 
that the first environmental dividend has been achieved.   
6.2 Achieving the second dividend 
For the second dividend to be achieved, the net revenue from the levy must be 
sufficient to permit reduction of distortionary taxes. The Revenue Commissioners 
incurred costs of 1.56 million in setting up and advertising the levy, and collected 
9.6 million by the end of 2002. On the first anniversary of the introduction of the 
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levy, the Department of the Environment estimated that the annual receipts net of 
ongoing administration costs would amount to 8m37. Arguably, future revenue may 
be lower, due to the change in consumer behaviour. In that respect, the levy may 
represent something of a windfall gain for the exchequer. Clearly, however, revenue 
is raised which could be used to reduce distortionary taxes.  
 
A second condition for achievement of the second dividend is the recycling of these 
revenues, so as to permit a reduction in taxes on labour and enterprise. The revenue 
from the plastic bag levy goes to an “Environment Fund” under the control of the 
Minister for the Environment. Of the 8 million net revenue raised in 2002, two thirds 
was allocated for the establishment of four new government boards38. It is not clear 
that these would have been funded from general tax revenue if the Environment Fund 
had not been available, and so the second dividend of a potential reduction in other 
taxes cannot be demonstrated.  
 
A third condition for the second dividend to be achieved is that the revenue from the 
tax must outweigh costs incurred in its collection. This study shows that both 
consumers and retailers suffer an ongoing welfare cost as a result of the levy. 
Employment has also been lost in the domestic plastic bag manufacturing industry. 
Immediately prior to the introduction of the levy, the Fehily report39 identified three 
major domestic manufacturers of plastic bags. One firm40 was forced to close with the 
loss of 23 jobs, citing a reduction in orders following the announcement of the levy in 
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September 200241. One42 has since closed for unrelated reasons, while the third, 
Shabra Ltd, has had no loss of employment43.  There has, of course, been a 
corresponding increase in the consumption of paper bags, although since production is 
spread among many smaller firms, the effect of the increased output on domestic 
employment is unclear. These costs are difficult to quantify, and make the 
achievement of the double dividend questionable, regardless of the amount of revenue 
raised, or the use to which it is put. Given these costs, and the fact that the revenue is 
ring-fenced for an environment fund, it is difficult to argue that the double dividend 
was achieved in this case. 
 
7. Conclusion and avenues for future research 
There are several limitations to this study. Initially it must be acknowledged that it is 
primarily a case study on the effectiveness of the levy, with a view to establishing 
whether it could be implemented, possibly with improvements, in other jurisdictions. 
In common with all survey results, the data is derived from those willing to complete 
questionnaires and give interviews on the subject. In that respect, the sample could be 
self-selecting and prone to bias. This is to some extent mitigated by the way in which 
the questionnaires were administered. Gender differences on attitudes to the levy may 
be driven by dissimilar shopping patterns, though again, this effect is mitigated by the 
way in which the questionnaires were administered. A wider survey would provide a 
more complete picture.  
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Nonetheless, the surveys show that the levy has achieved a high level of public 
acceptance, in both rural and urban locations, and across age and gender barriers. 
There is a high degree of compliance in a wide range of retailers, despite the low level 
of audit and inspection. The advertising campaign around the introduction of the levy 
was critical to its success, and made the implementation easier for traders. The fact 
that the retailers were seen not to benefit directly from the levy also eased 
implementation.  The use of lightweight plastic bags has fallen dramatically, and so it 
is clear that the first dividend has been achieved.  
 
Some things could have been done more effectively. Of the points on the checklist for 
successful implementation of environmental taxes referred to earlier, the plastic bag 
levy fails on early consultation with stakeholders, built-in evaluation measures and, 
arguably, recycling of revenues44. Retailers bear most of the burden of implementing 
the levy, and suffer a substantial, if unquantified welfare cost in the process. They 
were not involved in designing the levy, or in drawing up the information pack that 
was sent to shops. Monitoring of implementation has been minimal.  Most retailers 
would have preferred a total ban. Relatively little analysis has been done on the 
environmental damage caused by alternatives to the lightweight plastic bag, and there 
is little public awareness that paper bags could be equally costly to the environment in 
the long run. The ring-fencing of the tax into the environmental find effectively limits 
the achievement of a double dividend.  
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However, while the second dividend was not achieved, it may have been achievable. 
Had the revenue raised not been ring-fenced, it could have been used to reduce 
slightly the distortionary taxes present in the Irish system. If the use of environment 
fund can reduce the need for other taxes to be raised, it is possible that these 
distortions can be reduced.  The applications of this fund will be critical in 
determining if the some degree of the second dividend can be achieved in the future. 
